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PARKER V. BROWN-GONE TO HECHT: A NEW
TEST FOR STATE ACTION EXEMPTIONS
Conceived as "our economic magna carta,"1 the federal antitrust
laws prohibit monopolization or attempts to monopolize,2 contracts,
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,8 mergers which les-
sen competition or tend to create a monopoly,4 and other unfair meth-
ods of competition.5 Soon after these antitrust laws were enacted,
Congress began to grant express statutory exemptions6 and the courts
began to find implied exemptions.7  One of these implied exemptions
was found in Parker v. Brown.8 In that case, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the states were not subject to the federal antitrust laws
and could regulate local incidents of interstate commerce as long as
Congresss had not preempted such state regulation. This recognition
gave birth to the state action exemption from the federal antitrust laws.
This new exemption generated problems for the lower courts because the
Parker Court failed to define state action. Rather, it spoke in broad,
general terms about the "legislative command of the state."9  Lower
courts were left to determine how much state involvement and super-
vision was necessary to justify finding an exemption.
Because of this lack of a clearly defined standard, increasing num-
bers of defendants have sought to avoid the impact of the federal anti-
1. Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286,
1302 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
2. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
3. Id. §1.
4. Clayton Act, id. § 18.
5. Robinson-Patman Act, id. § 13 (price discrimination); Clayton Act, id. § 14
(tie-ins and exclusive dealing contracts); Federal Trade Commission Act, id. § 45 (un-
fair methods of competition).
6. E.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970); Federal Communica-
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 221-22 (1970); Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970);
The Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. 9H 5, 22 (1970). See generally Committee on Antitrust Exemptions, 33 ANTI-
musT L.J. (1967), for a discussion of the rationales behind the exemption.
7. E.g., Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904); Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908
(C.C.S.C. 1895).
8. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker "is apparently the decision which opened
the eyes of the antitrust bar to the possibilities of avoiding the impact of the antitrust
laws, if only state governmental action [were] in some way involved." Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
9. See 317 U.S. at 350.
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trust laws by claiming immunity under the governmental action exemp-
tions in recent years. These claims have met with varying success de-
pending on the particular lower court's understanding of the rationale
for the exemptions. Some courts, ignorant of this rationale, have
greatly impeded the development of national antitrust policy by grant-
ing an exemption where it should have been withheld.'" If the anti-
trust laws are to accomplish their objective of maintaining a free econ-
omy,11 they must not be eroded by erroneous findings of governmental
action in the lower federal courts.
Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals announced
a test in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 2 This test can clear up the confu-
sion in the state action exemption area. Hecht dealt with an implied
federal action exemption," the national counterpart of the state action
exemption. Although the basic reasons for granting an implied federal
action exemption differ from the reasons for granting an implied state
action exemption, the Hecht test can be used successfully for both be-
cause its central inquiry is into the intent of the legislature-whether
state or federal-to supplant the federal antitrust laws with some other
form of regulaton.14
This note will discuss the judicially implied governmental action
exemptions,15 explore two different tests presently used by the courts
10. See text accompanying notes 44-50, infra.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963),
which recognized the "indispensable role of antitrust policy in the maintenance of a
free economy"; Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1302 (5th Cir. 1971), which declared: "Our antitrust laws constitute our eco-
nomic magna carta, designed to protect against predatory oppression. Conceived as
such a writ, they must not be facilely negated."
12. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
13. See text accompanying notes 51-57, infra.
14. See 444 F.2d at 935; George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), in which the court
stated: "Our reading of Parker convinces us that valid governmental action confers
antitrust immunity only when government determines that competition is not the sum-
mum bonum in a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide an alternate form
of public regulation."
15. This note will not consider the Noerr-Pennington exemption from the anti-
trust laws although defendants often raise both the Noerr-Pennington and the govern-
mental action defenses together. Insofar as these cases discuss the governmental action
exemption, they will be considered in this note. See, e.g. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc.
v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1970). The Noerr-Pennington
exemption confers immunity on joint efforts by private citizens to procure governmental
action. It therefore immunizes private action-not governmental action-because of a
citizen's First Amendment right to petition his government for change, even though
his motive may be anticompetitive. See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Trans-
port Co., 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
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to exempt state and federal action from the federal antitrust laws, and
propose adoption of the Hecht analysis for determining if a state action
exemption should be implied.
Antitrust Immunity and the Constitution
An understanding of the differing policies justifying an exemp-
tion for governmental action requires awareness of the antitrust laws'
constitutional basis. The federal antitrust laws were enacted pursuant
to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce;16 consequently,
activities not in the flow of nor substantially affecting such commerce
escape the rigid proscriptions of these laws.lT However, once an ac-
tivity is found to be in interstate commerce, they apply. s
There are two types of governmental action-state and federal-
for which an exemption from antitrust law is granted.' 9 State and fed-
eral governments are sovereigns within their constitutionally defined
U.S. 127 (1961). See generally Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-
Pennington Defense, 66 MicH. L. REv. 333 (1967); Comment, Antitrust Immunity:
Recent Exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington Defense, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV.
1133 (1971); Comment, Lobbying Before Licensing Agencies: Noerr-Pennington Re-
assessed, 51 B.U.L. REv. 90 (1971); Note, Antitrust: The Brakes Fail on the Noerr
Doctrine, 57 CALr. L. REv. 518 (1969); Note, Application of the Sherman Act to
Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 847 (1968).
16. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 333 (1904).
17. Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.
1969).
18. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739-40,
n.3 (9th Cir. 1954). "The courts have continued to apply two tests in determining
whether particular conduct is 'interstate commerce' subject to the Sherman Act. Un-
der the 'in commerce' or qualitative test, any activity which is 'within the flow of
interstate commerce' may be scrutinized under the Sherman Act, even though the ac-
tivity is local and has only an insubstantial effect on the flow of commerce. By con-
trast, under the 'affecting commerce' or quantitative test, the issue is whether the effect
on commerce is significant. Purely local activity may still violate the Sherman Act if
it substantially affects an interstate commerce market either directly or through its in-
terplay with other business activities." ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST DEVEL-
OPMENTS 1955-1968; A SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 39 (1968).
19. A possible third type of governmental action, foreign action, is analogous to
state action because the courts recognize a foreign government's sovereign right to reg-
ulate its own internal commerce. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Mara-
caibe, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970). Cf. Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (rejecting defendant's claim of Parker
immunity because its subsidiary was acting as an arm of the Canadian government,
the Court found no evidence the Canadian government approved or would have ap-
proved the abuse of delegated authority by the defendant's subsidiary). But see Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
petition for cert. dismissed, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1969).
For a discussion of foreign action cases, see Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 329, 340 (1972).
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spheres and, as sovereigns, are presumed to act in the public interest. 20
The antitrust laws, therefore, have been held not to apply to them. 21
More specifically, the state may regulate activities in or affecting inter-
state commerce which are of local concern and are not pre-empted by
Congress. 2  Because the state is neither a corporation nor a person with-
in the meaning of the Sherman Act 23 and because the commerce clause
limits the state's control over interstate commerce, the state may re-
strain trade as long as it does not unduly obstruct, burden or discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce.2 ' Therefore, a finding of constitu-
tionally permitted state action exempts a state from antitrust law ap-
plication.25 In determining whether such state action exists, there are
two major points of inquiry. These are the identity of the real decision
maker and the degree of state supervision of private action. This in-
quiry focuses on the often elusive distinction between state and private
action. Some courts warn against the "facile conclusion that action
by any public official automatically confers exemption"2 and criticize
other courts for using "a much too talismanic approach where scrupu-
20. "The section of the act of 1890, sued upon, gives a right of action for any in-
jury by any other person or corporation. The state is not a corporation. A corpora-
tion is a creature of the sovereign power, deriving its life from its creator. The state
is a sovereign having no derivative powers, exercising its sovereignty by divine right.
The state gets none of its powers from the general government. It has bound itself
by compact with the other sovereign states not to exercise certain of its sovereign
rights, and has conceded these to the Union, but in every other respect it retains all its
sovereignty which existed anterior to and independent of the Union. Nor can it be said
that the state is a person in the sense of this act." Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908,
911 (C.C.S.C. 1895).
21. "Anti-Trust acts are designed to insure competition and thereby promote the
public interest; and as the sovereign acts in the public interest the Courts have held
that these acts do not suppress the sovereign." Stroud v. Benson, 155 F. Supp. 482,
492 (E.D.N.C. 1957), vacated on other grounds, 254 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 817 (1958).
22. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). There is no
federal pre-emption where state and federal regulatory schemes are complementary.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943).
23. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911 (C.C.S.C. 1895).
24. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
25. An exemption from antitrust law based on state regulation does not go beyond
state borders because the state is permitted to regulate only those activities in or af-
fecting interstate commerce of particular local concern. Morton v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd 414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970), in which the defendant claimed its price discrimina-
tion was mandated by the Pennsylvania Milk Control Act and was, therefore, valid under
Parker v. Brown. The court held that since the Pennsylvania Act did not and could not
require price floors beyond its borders, the defendant's discrimination in Delaware
and New Jersey was not exempt from the antitrust laws.
26. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30
(1st Cir. 1970).
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lous distinctions are called for,"27 while other courts caution that
"[t]he concept of state action is not susceptible to rigid, bright line
rules. 28  A brief review of the criteria used in finding an implied fed-
eral action exemption culminating in a discussion of the Hecht test will
provide the necessary background to an analysis of the elusive state
action concept.
The Federal Action Exemption
While the state action exemption is used to maintain favorable
federal-state relations,2 9 the federal action exemption does not involve
the balancing of the interests of two different sovereigns. Rather, the
task of the courts is to reconcile a long established antitrust policy with
a more recently enacted federal statute which apparently conflicts with
antitrust policy. To find federal action superseding the antitrust laws,
the courts must imply an intent on the part of Congress to partially re-
peal the antitrust laws.30 Courts are reluctant to do so:
We have long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a funda-
mental national economic policy and have therefore concluded
that we cannot lightly assume that the enactment of a special regu-
latory scheme for particular aspects of an industry was intended
to render the more general provisions of the antitrust laws wholly
inapplicable to that industry.31
Only in cases where the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that
it is clearly repugnant to the antitrust laws will the court find an im-
plied repeal of the antitrust laws,32 and any such repeal is only pro
tanto to the extent of this repugnancy.33
Since the enactment of the Sherman Act, Congress has created a
myriad of federal regulatory agencies charged with a variety of duties
and granted multifarious powers, but the courts have not readily implied
an exemption. For example, many agencies are required to consider
the public interest in arriving at their decisions. The courts recognize
antitrust considerations as relevant to the public interest but refuse to
grant a federal action exemption to those industries regulated by agen-
cies which are guided by this public interest principle.34 Furthermore,
27. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
28. Woods Exploration & Prod. Co., v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286,
1294 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. Committee on Antitrust Exemptions, Introduction, 33 ANTITRUST L.i. 1, 3
(1967).
30. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
31. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966).
32. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
33. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 457 (1945).
34. See California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959).
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an agency's weighing of the public interest with respect to an industry
practice does not constitute a final determination of whether the indus-
try's practice violates the antitrust laws.3 5 Even the explicit, statutory
delegation to a regulatory agency of the power to determine antitrust
questions is not a blanket exemption. The courts still must deter-
mine whether the agency is empowered to deal with the very conduct
which is challenged in an antitrust suit.36 Agency approval of private
action does not confer an implied federal action exemption unless the
conduct has been exempted in the regulatory statute.37
For example, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Power Commission are given the power to approve mergers and are
required to consider antitrust questions relevant to any merger. 38  De-
spite these statutory requirements, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the parties to the merger are not immune from an antitrust
35. See, e.g., National Aviation Trades Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d
209 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
420 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In Northern Gas, the commission granted a pipeline
company permission to construct and maintain a natural gas pipeline. This commission
order was challenged by a competitor. The court held that the commission was obli-
gated to weigh the antitrust implications of its orders in considering whether the proposed
pipeline was in the public interest and remanded the case to the commission because
it had not given adequate consideration to the serious anticompetitive effect of its or-
der. But see Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 193 F.2d
230 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd 343 U.S. 414 (1952) where the court refused to remand or
set aside the commission's order because of alleged inadequate consideration of anti-
trust questions. The court stated: "The net effect of what we have already said is
that, though regulated industries are not per se exempt from the antitrust laws and
repeals by implication are not favored, the antitrust laws are superseded by more speci-
fic regulatory statutes to the extent of the repugnancy between them." 193 F.2d at 235.
36. See, e.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296,
305-06 (1963), where the Court held the Civil Aeronautics Board's authority in grant-
ing, qualifying, or denying certificates to air carriers, in modifying, suspending, or re-
voking these certificates, and in allowing or disallowing affiliations between common
carriers and air carriers covered those precise ingredients of the antitrust violations
charged in the government suit.
37. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 93 S. Ct. 573 (1973); Marnell v.
United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See Carna-
tion Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213 (1966). In both Ricci and Marnell
the courts recognized that the federal agencies involved had no power to confer fed-
eral action immunity on the defendants' actions, yet in Ricci the Court stayed the anti-
trust proceedings until the Commodity Exchange Commission had passed on the valid-
ity of the defendants' conduct under the Commodity Exchange Act. In Marnell the
court denied a stay which would have permitted the Interstate Commerce Commission
to review the defendant's conduct.
38. Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970). Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. § 717f(c) (issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity); see
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); California v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
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suit challenging the agency approved merger.30 The courts have justi-
fied these decisions on the grounds that implied repeals of the antitrust
laws are strongly disfavored and the Congress knows how to explic-
itly exempt these approved mergers if it desires. 41  Furthermore, if the
courts were to permit regulatory agencies to make final determinations
of antitrust issues, this might result in a lack of uniformity of deci-
sions. 42
The foregoing illustrates the courts' reluctance to imply federal ac-
tion exemptions from the antitrust laws.4" However, the lack of a
clearly defined standard for the courts to apply in scrutinizing an al-
leged implied exemption sometimes results in erroneous decisions.
Such an erroneous decision was Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec-
tric Cooperative, Inc.,4" in which the court of appeals overcame the
traditional reluctance to impliedly repeal the antitrust laws and in do-
ing so found a federal action exemption. Alabama Power sued the
Alabama Electric Cooperative (AEC) and the United States Rural
Electrification Administration (REA) to enjoin the consummation of
a loan from the REA to the AEC. In addition, Alabama Power sought
to recover treble damages under the antitrust laws. It claimed that the
REA requirement that the AEC obtain thirty-five year exclusive deal-
ing contracts with its electricity distribution customers as security for
the loan violated the antitrust laws. The court responded that the
REA, the AEC and its customers were immune under the governmental
action exemption. The court also held that Alabama Power lacked
standing to sue for judicial review of the REA administrator's deci-
sion or to sue under the federal antitrust laws.45 In the majority's view,
39. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482
(1962). But see Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 93 S. Ct. 647 (1973)
(approval by Civil Aeronautics Board immunizes merger from antitrust law).
40. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-201 (1939).
41. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
42. See also Symposium on Regulated Industries and Antitrust, 32 AriTrrusT L.J.
215, 230 (1966), where it is asserted that regulated businesses sometimes complain
of the unnecessary complications involved in dealing with both the regulatory agency
and the Department of Justice in resolving antitrust questions.
43. See text accompanying notes 30-42 supra.
44. 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968).
45. "When faced with attacks upon the REA's competition with private power
companies, the courts have responded by holding, almost interchangeably, that the at-
tackers lack standing or that the Administrator's acts are unreviewable. Such hold-
ings had previously been limited to challenges of the validity of loans; however, in
Alabama Power the Fifth Circuit unquestioningly employed the 'same rationale' to
repulse an antitrust attack on the all-requirements contracts. This reliance upon
'loan' precedents to avoid a merits determination of an antitrust claim is of dubious
validity. In the first place, the 'rationale' to which it referred rarely has been ade-
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the REA's statutory grant of broad discretion to approve security for
loans was enough to justify an implied federal action exemption for the
AEC and its customers.46
A holding of a federal action exemption based solely on the agen-
cy's broad discretion was wholly unjustified. Nothing in the Rural
Electrification Act nor its legislative history indicated that the REA
had the authority to confer an exemption on its borrowers or its bor-
rowers' customers.4 7  National antitrust policy most certainly out-
weighed the policy of the Rural Electrification Act of bringing low cost
electricity to rural areas.4 8 The REA was not required to consider
antitrust questions in approving security for its loans and its decisions
were not judicially reviewable.49 Had the Alabama Power court con-
sidered these facts, it would have concluded that Congress did not in-
tend to grant an exemption to the REA's borrowers and their custom-
ers. The Alabama Power decision was not only a defeat for the plain-
tiff, but also for free competition. Judge Godbold, in his vigorous dis-
sent stated:
It boggles the imagination to suggest that the myriad of govern-
ment agencies having the power to lend (each based on Con-
gressional determination that the particular lending power author-
ized is in the national interest) are, by reason of routine adminis-
trative control over sufficiency of collateral, vested with implied
power to carve out of the national economy exempt enclaves in
which borrowers may deal free of the antitrust laws. 0
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.
The Alabama Power case spotlighted the need for clear standards
quately explained, even in the loan context. Moreover, the policies which may com-
pel insulation of the Administrator's loan decisions from judicial scrutiny are not nec-
essarily applicable in the contract context. Thus, even if the 'rationale' were clarified,
its summary extension is nevertheless improper." Comment, Alabama Power Company
v. Alabama Electric Cooperative: Rural Electrification and the Antitrust Laws-Irre-
sistible Force Meets Immovable Object, 55 VA. L. REV. 325, 332 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Rural Electrification].
46. 394 F.2d at 674-75.
47. Rural Electrification, supra note 45, at 355-56; 394 F.2d at 683 (Godbold,
J., dissenting).
48. Rural Electrification, supra note 45, at 333.
49. Id. "Congressional intent, express or implied, is the dispositive factor in de-
termining the permissibility and scope of judicial review of administrative action. On
its face, the REA Act neither provides for nor prohibits judicial review. However,
the legislative history, although silent as to the courts' role, manifests a clear intent to
confer wide discretion on the Administrator. Moreover, Congress has resisted all sub-
sequent attempts to limit this discretion by institutional tools other than judicial re-
view. Thus, an inference could reasonably be drawn that Congress did intend to pre-
clude judicial intervention, and this conclusion is buttressed by congressional insulation
of other loan-dispensing agencies from judicial scrutiny."
50. 394 F.2d at 683.
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to be applied in granting or withholding an implied federal action ex-
emption. That need was satisfied in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.51
where the court proposed an excellent six point test for determining
whether Congress intended to impliedly repeal the antitrust laws to the
extent of their repugnancy to a newer federal statute.
In Hecht, a group of businessmen seeking to start a professional
football team in the District of Columbia brought suit against the Wash-
ington Redskins, the National Football League and the District of
Columbia Armory Board. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants
had entered into a conspiracy to restrain trade because the Armory
Board had agreed to lease to the Redskins for thirty years the only
stadium in Washington, D.C., suitable for professional football. The
lease barred the Armory Board from renting the stadium to any other
professional football team for the duration of the lease and, thus, gave
the Redskins a monopoly on all professional football in the area. The
district court ruled that since the Armory Board was an instrumentality
of the District of Columbia, its action was exempt from the antitrust
laws." - The court of appeals reversed because the statute creating the
Armory Board did not measure up to the court's test for an implied
federal action exemption. 53
The Hecht court conducted a six point inquiry into the District
of Columbia Stadium Act. This inquiry considered: (1) whether the
specific language of the statute indicated a congressional intent to sup-
plant the antitrust laws with some other form of regulation, (2)
whether any legislative history indicated such a congressional intent,
(3) whether the importance of the governmental action asserted over-
rode antitrust policy, (4) whether the agency was required to consider
the possible anticompetitive effect of its actions, (5) whether the agency
had broad, pervasive regulatory powers, and (6) whether the agen-
51. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1970).
53. "We think it significant that in those cases where the antitrust laws were
held not to apply there was a national or state policy of importance approximately
equal to the antitrust laws involved. . . . Mn the federal regulatory cases such as
Silver, Philadelphia Bank, and others. . there was a conscious or implied evaluation of
the importance of the national policy reflected in the creation of the regulatory agency
compared with that of the federal antitrust laws. The agency's responsibilities, the
'pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme,' the extent to which the agency itself was
called upon to pass upon antitrust considerations, and the degree to which it had in
fact done so as reflected in the record, were all considered. Since the creation of the
regulatory agency and the definition of its responsibilities stemmed from the same
source as the antitrust laws, i.e., the U.S. Congress, an effort was made to reconcile
the possibly conflicting national policies. In almost every case there is a reiteration of
the theme that repeal or immunity or exemption from the federal antitrust laws will
not be lightly implied." 444 F.2d at 946-47.
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cy's actions were subject to meaningful judicial review.54 After apply-
ing this test, the court concluded Congress did not intend to exempt
the Armory Board from the federal antitrust laws:
We suggest that the action of Congress in providing a public
stadium for the District of Columbia, while a governmental act of
considerable importance to this particular community, hardly rises
to the same dignity or furthers as important policies as the action
of Congress in regulating the securities exchanges, the national
banks, oil and gas pipelines, aviation or maritime routes, and that if
in the consideration of cases arising from those federal regulatory
agencies it is necessary for the Supreme Court and other courts to
examine the extent to which the antitrust laws apply, it is reasona-
ble to hold here that we must find a definite, clearly expressed,
specific intent of Congress to rule out the applicability of the anti-
trust laws to the acts of the Armory Board before such exemption
can be granted. 55
A finding of federal action exemption under the Hecht test is
predicated on affirmative findings in most, if not all, of the six areas of
inquiry. In examining the language of the statute and its legislative his-
tory, the court is searching for some clue to Congress's intent to exempt
a federal regulatory agency from the antitrust laws. When the regula-
tory policy is weighed against antitrust policy, they should be at least
equal.16  If an agency is required to consider antitrust questions in ar-
riving at its decisions and its decisions are reviewable, these two fac-
tors, though not determinative, are persuasive. 57 The broader the agen-
cy's statutory directive and the more pervasive the regulatory scheme,
the more likely the court will find a federal action exemption.
The Hecht test was applied in two recent cases. Both refused to
find an implied federal action exemption, thereby protecting national
antitrust policy from further encroachment by specialized federal agen-
cies. In Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission,58
Judge Wilkey, who authored the Hecht opinion, was joined by two
more judges on the District of Columbia Circuit in reaffirming the
Hecht test. In Seatrain Lines, the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC) claimed exclusive jurisdiction to approve a merger of two
shipping lines and, consequently, a federal action exemption. The
court's step by step analysis touched on all six areas of inquiry in the
54. Id. at 935.
55. Id. at 947.
56. Antitrust laws further a policy "so basic to our social structure that-in the
absence of unequivocal exemption therefrom, either by specific statutory language or
by a purpose to enforce other policies of equal or greater importance-it would be
irrational to imply that Congress intended to authorize the conduct they proscribe."
Id. at 945.
57. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text, supra.
58. 460 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Hecht test. The court examined the Shipping Act of 1916"9 which the
commission claimed conferred antitrust jurisdiction. This examination
revealed no congressional intent to exempt FMC-approved mergers
from the antitrust laws. 0 The commission was required to consider
the antitrust implications of its actions and its approval could exempt
certain anticompetitive agreements from the antitrust laws. However,
mergers were not among these exempted agreements. 1 In the court's
view, the fact that no hearing was held to develop a record detailing
the commission's weighing of antitrust and industry considerations was
particularly damaging to the claim that federal action exemption was
conferred by approval of the merger.0 2 The court pointed out that a
full record was necessary for meaningful judicial review of administra-
tive action:
The weighing of the importance of governmental action contrary
to antitrust policy and the opportunity for judicial review were
two of the "relevant criteria" we enumerated in Hecht v. Pro-Foot-
ball, Inc.,. . . for determining "to what extent Congress has know-
ingly adopted a policy contrary to or inconsistent with the previ-
ously established antitrust laws .... -63
The Seatrain Lines court therefore concluded that Congress did not
intend to exempt mergers of shipping lines from the antitrust laws. 64
United States v. Otter Tail Power Co. 5 is another recent example
of the influence of the Hecht decision on a lower court's refusal to find
an implied federal action exemption despite contrary precedent. 66 The
government charged Otter Tail with an attempt to monopolize and ac-
tual monopolization of interstate commerce by refusing to sell at whole-
sale to its former retail customers, by refusing to wheel power 67 from
other wholesale suppliers to its former retail customers, and by attempt-
ing to obstruct the establishment of public power systems by its former
retail customers. One of Otter Tail's defenses was that its contract
with the Federal Bureau of Reclamation and its contracts with coop-
eratives approved by the Rural Electrification Administration prohib-
ited it from wheeling power to former retail customers. Otter Tail
59. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1970).
60. 460 F.2d at 948-49.
61. Id. at 941-42.
62. Id. at 948.
63. Id.
64. See also United States v. R. I. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 325 F. Supp. 656
(D.NJ. 1971). But see Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 405 F.2d
796 (9th Cir. 1968).
65. 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
66. See text accompanying notes 44-50, supra.
67. To "wheel power" means to permit the use of one's electrical power distribu-
tion facilities by another power supplier.
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contended that these contracts with or approved by federal agencies en-
titled it to a federal action exemption. Citing Hecht,68 the court re-
jected the claim of an exemption:
There is nothing in any of the legislation under which either
the Bureau of Reclamation markets its power or the rural electric
cooperatives operate which either expressly or impliedly confers
immunity from antitrust laws upon the actions of the Bureau in ne-
gotiating contracts for sale of power or upon the action of the REA
administrator in approving contracts between a cooperative and a
private power company.69
Seatrain Lines and Otter Tail Power demonstrate that the application
of the Hecht test can prevent the gradual erosion of national antitrust
policy by erroneous findings of an implied federal action exemption.
The State Action Exemption
The state action exemption is based on different principles than
the federal action exemption. In the state action area, the courts at-
tempt to give the state a free hand to regulate those local incidents of in-
terstate commerce which Congress has not chosen to regulate. The
courts, therefore, more readily imply a legislative intent to substitute
the state's regulation for national antitrust policy.70 This substitution is
in contrast with the federal action area where the courts are concerned
with an implied congressional repeal of the antitrust laws.7'
Before examining legislative intent to substitute state regulation
for federal antitrust policy, the court must find that the state and not
private individuals or corporations has acted. The Supreme Court has
spoken only in general terms about what constitutes valid state action.
This forces the lower federal courts to rely on their interpretation of
Parker v. Brown72 for guidance. Parker's regulatory scheme illustrates
the complicated mixtures of state regulation and private self-regulation
that the courts face in deciding where state action ends and private ac-
tion begins.7 3 In Parker, the California Agricultural Prorate Act was
designed to regulate the handling, disposition and price of raisins in
California. The act created a commission composed of nine members.
Eight of these members were appointed by the governor and confirmed
by the Senate. The ninth member was the State Director of Agricul-
ture, who served ex officio. Upon petition by raisin producers and
68. 331 F. Supp. at 64.
69. Id. at 63.
70. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
71. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
72. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
73. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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after public hearing, the commission was empowered to organize a pro-
rate zone and select a committee from nominees chosen by the raisin
producers, to formulate a marketing program. This program could be
rejected, modified or approved by the commission only after another
public hearing.74 If approved by the commission, the program was
then submitted to the raisin producers. Upon approval by sixty-five
percent of these producers, the director of agriculture was required to
declare the program instituted. The Supreme Court found the state
sufficiently enmeshed in this regulatory scheme to call it state action.
The regulatory scheme was created by the legislature and adequately
supervised by state officials.
Lower courts have clung to these facts as their guide in determin-
ing what is valid state action as opposed to private action. In two
areas of the state action exemption, the courts have had little trouble in
defining state action. First, the courts have repeatedly held that a state
which has an express policy favoring competition does not intend to
impliedly supplant the federal antitrust laws. In George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,75 such an express policy was
found in a state law requiring competitive bidding for contracts with
public agencies.7 6 In Woods Exploration & Production Co. v. Alu-
minum Co. of America,77 a Texas regulatory statute explicitly dis-
claimed any intent to interfere with the operation of state antitrust
laws.78 The court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to inter-
fere with federal antitrust laws either. Finally, in Asheville Tobacco
Board of Trade v. F.T.C.,79 a North Carolina statute authorizing the
formation of a trade association "to make reasonable rules and regula-
tions for the sale of leaf tobacco at auction on the warehouse floors in
the several towns and cities in North Carolina in which an auction mar-
ket is situated" also prohibited the association from controlling prices
or making rules and regulations in restraint of trade.8 ° This prohibi-
74. 317 U.S. at 347.
75. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
76. "In this case, however, the government bodies which Paddock sought to in-
fluence were acting under elaborate bid procedures designed to insure that purchases
were based solely on economic considerations. To hold that Paddock's conduct is ex-
empt in such circumstances would be tantamount to a grant of total immunity for
commercial dealings with the government." id. at 34.
77. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
78. "[Nothing herein shall in any manner affect, alter, diminish, change or mod-
ify the antitrust and/or monopoly statutes of this State, and that no provision of this
Act shall in any manner directly or indirectly authorize a violation of such antitrust
and/or monopoly statutes . T.. " Rxyv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6049d, § 13 (1962).
79. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
80. "Nothing in this section shall authorize the organization of any association
having for its purpose the control of prices or the making of rules and regulations in
restraint of trade." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-465 (1952).
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tion indicated to the court that the state legislature had not intended to
substitute regulation for the federal antitrust laws."' In these three
cases, the courts gave special force to state law expressing a policy fa-
voring unfettered competition.82
A second area of the state action exemption in which the judicial
standards are clearly defined and long established is that of state li-
censes and state created instrumentalities."3 When a state operates a
business or grants an exclusive or limited number of licenses to prac-
tice certain trades, neither the state nor the licensees are liable under
federal antitrust laws. If the state has the power to control competition
in an industry, it also has the power to eliminate competition.84 The
state may operate a public transportation system or a retail liquor busi-
ness as a monopoly8 5 or delegate its duties of operating and managing a
public airport to a single private corporation .8  The state may limit the
number of persons licensed to practice certain occupations87 and grant
81. The court further explained: "The teaching of Parker v. Brown is that the
antitrust laws are directed against individual and not state action. When a state has a
public policy against free competition in an industry important to it, the state may
regulate that industry in order to control or, in a proper case, to eliminate competition
therein. It may even permit persons subject to such control to participate in the
regulation, provided their activites are adequately supervised by independent state of-
ficials. . . . But such action must be state action, not individual action masquerading
as state action. A state can neither authorize individuals to perform acts which violate
the antitrust laws nor declare that such action is lawful." 263 F.2d at 509. Accord,
Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964), held that
there was no state action exemption because the board's regulations adopted in pur-
suance of a statute could not be considered of the same force and effect as state stat-
utes. Id. at 285-86. Nor was there mention of a specific antitrust disclaimer in the
statute, or any analysis of the state authorizing statute.
82. There are inherent dangers even where the state announces a policy against
free competition. As one commentator points out: "Typically, there may be a
broad state statutory or even constitutional provision which could be construed to au-
thorize a multitude of sins. Had the state legislators contemplated that their act would
legalize the particular restraint of trade in question? Most likely the thought
never came to their minds. If a state clearly enunciated a policy of eliminating com-
petition in a given industry, the task may be easier. But even then the particular
type of restraint may not have been one of the forms of restraint contemplated."
Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REv.
333, 341 (1967).
83. E.g., Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904); Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908
(C.C.S.C. 1895).
84. Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 137 (8th Cir.
1970).
85. Id.; Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.S.C. 1895).
86. E.W. Wiggens Airways Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
87. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904) (harbor pilots); Brechtel v. Board of
Examiners of Bar Pilots, 230 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. La. 1964) (bar pilots); Hitchcock
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exclusive permits to private businesses.88 The state is permitted to re-
strain or monopolize trade in these areas with impunity and to confer
an exemption on its private licensees because these areas are local
incidents of interstate commerce over which Congress has not exercised
preemptive control.
In the areas of alcoholic beverages, 9 fair trade laws, 0 and insur-
ance, 91 state law has special force vis L vis the antitrust laws. Yet
even in these special areas, there are limits to how far a state may go in
exempting activities from the antitrust laws. In United States v. Erie
County Malt Beverage Distributors Association,02 the Twenty-First
Amendment was held not to be a license for a private trade association
to fix prices and closing hours nor a license to enforce this group action
by boycotting intransigents in the absence of a state law authorizing
such conduct.
Even when state law authorizes conduct in violation of the anti-
trust laws, such conduct is not always exempt. In Parker v. Brown, the
Supreme Court warned that "a state does not give immunity to those
who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by
declaring that their action is lawful." 93  This principle prevailed in
Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley94 despite the special force
v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 353 U.S. 919
(1957) (doctors); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 69 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. II. 1946)
(dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (city licensing of taxicabs).
88. Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir.
1970) cert. denied 400 U.S. 1000 (1971), (exclusive lease in border tunnel; unclear
whether lessor is public or private corporation); Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver
State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969) (dictum) (exclusive garbage services
contract); Independent Taxicab Operators Ass'n v. Yellow Cab Co., 278 F. Supp.
979 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (exclusive taxicab stands on city streets); Miley v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957) (exclusive insurance contract).
See also Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 223 (D. Colo. 1971) (exclusive
ski school permit at federal ski area).
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
90. Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act amending Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
91. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970).
92. 264 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1959).
93. 317 U.S. at 351. Accord, Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 386, 389 (1951); Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904),
in which the Court held that a state by chartering a corporation under its laws could
not thereby exempt that corporation from federal antitrust law; nor could a state ex-
empt private action from antitrust law by declaring such private action to be lawful.
But see Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3rd Cir. 1968),
where the court held that the mere fact that the defendant's rebate practice was not
illegal under the Pennsylvania Milk Control Act did not exempt it under Parker. The
court added in dictum, however, that if the rebate practice were required by state law,
it might thereby become exempted from federal antitrust law. 395 F.2d at 424.
94. 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971).
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of state law with respect to alcoholic beverages and fair trade laws.
The Third Circuit held that the mandatory price filing program of the
Virgin Islands Alcoholic Beverages Fair Trade Law did not involve
governmental action sufficient to invoke the Parker doctrine. The law
required producers, importers and wholesalers to file fixed wholesale
prices and retailers to file fixed retail prices of liquor with the Board of
Alcoholic Beverages. The board had no power to approve, disapprove
or modify prices fixed by private persons, and, therefore, the fair trade
law was merely an attempt by the government to authorize individuals
to violate the antitrust laws.95 The court held that the defendant's price
fixing was not exempt under this regulatory scheme notwithstanding
the special force given state law with respect to fair trade and alcoholic
beverages.
In addition to the areas of alcoholic beverages and fair trade laws,
state law has been given special force in the insurance industry. This
is accomplished by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,96 which declares that
the federal antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of insur-
ance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."97
This section has been interpreted as permitting state regulation where
insurance activities have their local impact,98 but a state may not regu-
late insurance activities whose impact is felt outside its borders.9 9 The
courts have held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is nothing more than
a legislative declaration of the principles articulated in Parker v. Brown.
That is, states may regulate those local incidents of interstate commerce
which Congress has not pre-empted. In the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
Congress simply stated that by enacting the antitrust laws, it did not in-
tend to pre-empt state regulation of the business of insurance. If a
state's regulation of insurance indicates its intent to supplant the na-
tional antitrust laws, the state has conferred a state action exemption on
the regulated insurance companies. 100
WVhere the Confusion Lies
On similar facts different courts have reached opposite results as to
the amount of state regulation needed for a state action exemption in
various activities, including the regulation of insurance. In Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania,' 0 the defendant claimed
a state action exemption from the federal antitrust laws because its
95. Id. at 1018.
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
98. F.T.C. v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
99. F.T.C. v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
100. See text accompanying notes 104-07 infra.
101. 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
[Vol. 24
STATE ACTION EXEMPTIONS
payments, acquisition costs, reserves, and contracts were subject to
prior approval by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department. The de-
partment's decisions were subject to review by the county courts of com-
mon pleas. Noting the Pennsylvania statute's silence on the state's pol-
icy with respect to restraints of trade, the court concluded that regula-
tion and supervision alone did not constitute a delegation of govern-
mental authority to engage in monopolistic practices. Therefore, Blue
Cross was not exempt. The court explained that only a governmental
entity could engage in monopolistic practices:
Not only does the legislature create the entity involved or endow it
with governmental character, but it also directs and authorizes
that entity by means of the same statute to utilize anticompetitive
means to achieve a specific governmental purpose.10 2
On the other hand, in Fleming v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,10 3 an
implied state action exemption was found for a private insurance com-
pany whose rates were effective upon filing subject to later disallowance
by the state insurance commissioner. The mere fact that the state regu-
latory act provided general standards of conduct for the insurance in-
dustry and gave the insurance commissioner power to set aside rates
after notice and hearing was enough to justify an implied state action
exemption for private insurance companies.
Somewhere between these two extreme cases is Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Lanier.104 In that case, the court faced a mixture of state regula-
tion and private self-regulation. State law required all insurers to be-
long to a rating bureau and to adhere to rates, plans and classifications
promulgated by the bureau. The State Commissioner of Insurance was
ex officio chairman of the bureau and any rates proposed by the bureau
had to be approved by him after a public hearing.10 5 If the bureau
failed to propose acceptable rates, the commissioner could adopt his
own. The commissioner was required to hold public hearings before
approving, modifying or rejecting any of the bureau's proposals and his
decisions were appealable to the state superior court. 06 This was a
rather comprehensive state regulatory scheme. On the other hand, the
bureau was composed of private insurers. The insurance companies
paid the salaries of bureau personnel. Yet, the court found that the
industry-wide price fixing program was established and actively super-
vised by the state so a Parker exemption attached. The court was justi-
fied in finding an implied state action exemption because of the marked
similarities between the regulatory programs in Lanier and Parker.
102. Id. at 1111.
103. 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971).
104. 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
105. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 76-77 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
106. Id. at 81.
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Further justification was provided by Congress's explicit declaration
that the federal antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of in-
surance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."' a 7
These three cases demonstrate that on similar facts the courts are
likely to reach opposite and contradictory conclusions. In Blue Cross
the regulatory scheme was much more comprehensive than that in
Fleming. Yet, the Fleming court found an implied state action ex-
emption and the Blue Cross court found none. The lack of clearly de-
fined judicial standards can only perpetuate such inconsistent decisions.
Rate Making and Rate Filing
The judicial standards for finding state action in regulated indus-
tries when state law is not given special force are also ambiguous. One
major area of ambiguity is distinguishing between state rate making and
private rate filing. For example, in Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power
Co.,' the defendant's rates were challenged as anticompetitive. The
defendant countered that its rates had been approved by the Georgia
Public Services Commission after a full adversary hearing. ' The
commission was empowered to prevent unjust discriminations and to re-
quire reasonable and just rates. 110 Because the commission had made
major modifications in the rates before adopting them, the court held
the rates constituted state action."'
This case, when compared with Marnell v. United Parcel Service
of America, Inc.,11 2 demonstrates how similar state rate making
schemes and private rate filing schemes are. In Marnell, the plaintiff
accused the defendant of using monopolistic rates and joining in trade
restraining contracts. The defendant moved for a stay until the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the California Public Utilities Com-
mission had considered and ruled on the issues in the complaint. To
support its motion, the defendant claimed that federal and state regula-
tion of its business had put its rates and contracts outside the scrutiny
of the antitrust laws. As to the state regulation, the court found that
107. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
108. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062.
109. Compare Georgia Power with federal regulatory cases cited in notes 34-39,
supra, in which approval by a federal agency, even when the agency was charged with
the responsibility of weighing antitrust factors, did not exempt private parties from the
antitrust laws.
110. GA. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The trial court in Georgia Power characterized
the commission's approval of rates as legislative action and emphasized that failure
to obey the commission would result in fines. Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,
313 F. Supp. 860, 868 (M.D. Gas. 1970).
111. 440 F.2d at 1140.
112. 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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the defendant was required to get a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to which the Public Utilities Commission could attach
certain terms, limitations and conditions. State law also required the
defendant to file its rates with the commission prior to any rate in-
crease. Furthermore, the defendant had to give thirty days advance
notice to the commission and the public. The commission was em-
powered to hold hearings on rates, classifications, contracts, rules or
practices. At these hearings the defendant had to justify any rate in-
crease, or the commmission could establish rates, classifications, con-
tracts, rules or practices which it thought reasonable. While one court
might call this regulatory scheme "comprehensive,""' 3 the Marnell court
found it to be "one of general supervision rather than one of specific di-
rection.""' 4  The court emphasized that the California scheme was one
of rate filing rather than rate fixing since rates prescribed by United
Parcel Service automatically became effective thirty days after filing.
Yet, in both Marnell and Georgia Power the respective commissions
could hold hearings on rates and approve, reject or modify rates. Also,
both commissions required that the rates be reasonable. The funda-
mental difference between the two decisions is that Marnell involves
rate filing while Georgia Power involves rate making. The Georgia
Power court gave "more weight to the sheer existence of state action' 5
without attempting to reconcile federal antitrust and state regulatory
policies." ' It labeled the action of the Georgia commission's "mean-
ingful regulation and supervision by the state."'1" 7  The Marnell court,
on the other hand, concentrated on the general nature of the super-
vision and on the fact that the defendant had never been required to
change a rate or contract filed with the California commission. 1 8 De-
spite the similarities between these two regulatory schemes, the Marnell
and the Georgia Power courts successfully distinguished private rate
filing from state rate fixing.
The court in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric and
113. See Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 313 F. Supp. at 868.
114. 260 F. Supp. at 409.
115. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 937, n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
116. See also Wainwright v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D.
Ga. 1969), where defendants claimed their fixed prices were exempt from antitrust
law because the Georgia Milk Commission regulated these prices. The court found
that the commission was a state agency with strict standards for establishing price
recommendations and sanctions for violations of the Act, but left open to proof whether
the defendants' prices were due to the commission's regulation or to an unlawful con-
spiracy. This is a unique approach to the reconciliation of federal antitrust and
state regulatory policies since it leaves open to proof whether state regulation or
the defendant's own actions were the real cause of the fixed prices.
117. 440 F.2d at 1140.
118. See 260 F. Supp. at 410.
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Power Co.'19 was not so successful. This case has been judicially ac-
knowledged as "the case which seems to go the farthest in applying the
Parker doctrine.' 120  Actually, Washington Gas Light goes too far.
The court found that the Virginia State Corporation Commission had
the power to prescribe rates and regulate utilities. However, the com-
mission had made no investigation nor given any approval to the de-
fendant's alleged anticompetitive activities. Notwithstanding this lack
of active state supervision of the defendant's activities, 121 the court held
that the commission's silence signified approval, and this "approval"
constituted state action under Parker v. Brown. 22
Unlike Parker, Washington Gas Light does not substitute a coun-
tervailing state regulatory policy for the national policy of unfettered
competition. If this dangerous precedent is followed, any state regula-
tion will suffice to replace national antitrust policy.'2 3 One critic of
the case explains:
The facts of Washington Gas Light make it a particularly in-
appropriate context in which to find tacit approval justifying the
state action exemption. Moreover, it is generally incorrect to use
the tacit approval theory to justify a state action exemption in any
case where anticompetitive private activities have been neither di-
rected nor actively approved by state officials. To do so renders
impotent the federal antitrust protection provided consumers and
competitors without necessarily substituting a state's policy determi-
nation that the public interest is thereby served.' 24
The Washington Gas Light decision spotlights the need for a clear
standard to apply in the search for the elusive state action exemption.
The Hecht Test and State Action
In the federal action exemption field, the Hecht court's six point
analysis provides an excellent approach when Congress has not explic-
itly stated whether a specific agency is exempt or may confer an exemp-
119. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
120. Norman's on the Waterfront Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1018 (3d Cir.
1971).
121. The defendant offered builders free installation of underground electricity if
they installed all electric appliances. The court's alternative holding was that this did
not constitute an illegal tying arrangement. 438 F.2d at 253-54.
122. Compare Washington Gas Light with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 (1940), in which the Court declared: "Though the employees
of the government may have known of these programs and winked at them or tacitly
approved of them, no immunity would have thereby been obtained." The court later
added: "Mhe typical method adopted by Congress when it has lifted the ban of the
Sherman Act is the scrutiny and approval of designated public representatives." Id. at
227, n.60.
123. See Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 339 F. Supp.
1391 (E.D. Va. 1972).
124. 85 HARv. L. REV. 670, 673-74 (1972).
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tion from the antitrust laws. The Hecht test inquires into: (1) The spe-
cific language of the congressional statute, (2) any legislative history
which throws light on congressional intent, (3) the relative importance
of the governmental action asserted to override antitrust policy, (4)
whether the agency is required to consider the possible anticompetitive
effect of its actions, (5) whether the agency is required to adhere to a
clearly defined and restricted statutory directive, and (6) to what ex-
tent the agency's actions are subject to judicial review.1" 5 The purpose
of this thorough inquiry is to determine whether Congress intended to
replace the antitrust laws with some other form of economic regulation.
Application of these six points will prevent the granting of er-
roneous federal action exemptions. One such erroneous exemption was
granted in Alabama Power.'Y6 In that case, the court applied only one
of Hecht's six points.' 2 7 In doing so, the court conferred an exemption
on the Rural Electrification Administration as well as its borrowers and
their customers. 128  A Hecht analysis would have found that the Rural
Electrification Act failed all but one of the six points and thus was not
entitled to a federal action exemption. 129
In the federal action area, there are only a few erroneous decisions
such as Alabama Power. However, when state action is involved, in-
consistencies are more common. 3 0 A uniform state action test has not
yet been developed. Clearly, the state has authority over activities in
or affecting interstate commerce which are of local concern and which
Congress has not preempted.'" Any time a state legislature expressly
disclaims any intent to interfere with the federal antitrust laws, the
courts deny state action exemptions.' 32 In the absence of such a dis-
claimer, the courts should make every attempt to reconcile the state
125. 444 F.2d at 935.
126. See text accompanying notes 44-50, supra.
127. The Alabama Power court relied solely on the REA administrator's broad,
discretionary powers as justification for granting a federal action exemption. The
Hecht test's fifth inquiry is whether the agency has broad, pervasive regulatory powers.
See text accompanying note 54 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
129. The Rural Electrification Act would fail all but the fifth Hecht inquiry. See
text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 101-24, supra.
131. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). It is noteworthy that if the anti-
trust laws were considered to have pre-empted the field of business regulation, there
would be no state action exemption.
132. Congress could stop the erosion of national antitrust policy by enacting a
statute requiring the states to declare their intent to supplant federal law with state
regulation. This would eliminate the need for an implied exemption because no im-
munity would arise unless the state explicitly announced its intent to exempt a state
regulatory scheme from the operation of the antitrust laws. See text accompanying
notes 75-82, supra.
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and federal policies rather than hold the federal antitrust policy
ousted. 11 3  Thus, two major points of judicial inquiry are the iden-
tity of the real decision maker and the degree of state supervision. 134
The state cannot exempt private action in violation of the antitrust laws
or declare such private action to be lawful.
Unfortunately, in the state action area, the application of these two
inquiries has not achieved any uniformity in the decisions. If the high
dignity13 of federal antitrust laws is to be maintained, a more probing
analysis of the state action exemption must be implemented. The Hecht
test provides an excellent model for establishing a clear implied state ac-
tion exemption standard. In applying this test, the courts would scru-
tinize the state statute and its legislative history to find an intent to sup-
plant federal antitrust laws. A state's express declaration of such in-
tent would justify granting immunity because a basic tenet of the state
action exemption is that the states are allowed to regulate local incidents
of interstate commerce. The state legislatures, however, rarely make
the court's job so easy.
In the absence of explicit declarations of intent, the court would
examine the state regulatory act and its legislative history to determine
whether the state agency is required to weigh the anticompetitive impli-
cations of its actions and whether its actions are reviewable. Affirma-
tive findings on these two points would be strong indicia of an intent
to substitute regulation for the federal antitrust laws. The courts would
also look for a comprehensive regulatory scheme. However, they would
not be required to weigh the federal antitrust policy against state regu-
latory policy. In matters of local concern not pre-empted by Congress,
the state may regulate to the exclusion of the national antitrust laws
without proving that its regulatory policy outweighs federal antitrust
policy. Thus, the application of the Hecht test in the area of state ac-
tion would provide a clearly defined standard for the granting of anti-
133. "[W]here state action is concerned . . . the inquiry should be to what extent
is the state action permissible as not contravening the federal antitrust laws, which in
our federal system constitute overriding legislation under the federal commerce power."
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d at 935.
134. "An anti-competitive practice may receive only the most cursory inspection
by public officials . . . or public officials may approve conduct without consideration
or awareness of its anti-competitive aspects. . . . The issue in such cases is not
whether the action was in form 'governmental,' but whether the real decision makers
were public officials or private businessmen." George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 n.8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
135. "mhe basic philosophy of our antitrust policy has been so long established,
is of such recognized economic importance, and has assumed in the statutory scheme
of things such high dignity that . . . immunity from antitrust laws is not lightly im-
plied." Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d at 935; accord Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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trust exemptions. This standard would lead to consistency while pro-
tecting competition and upholding the federal antitrust policy.
Conclusion
As state and federal regulation of. business becomes more and
more common, defendants in antitrust suits more frequently seek a gov-
ernmental action exemption as a defense to antitrust liability. Hecht v.
Pro-Football, Inc. sets forth a six point test that lower courts can apply
in analyzing the facts for an implied federal action exemption because
the purpose of the Hecht test is to find a legislative intent to oust the
antitrust laws. The application of this test will assure consistent deci-
sions and protect against the erosion of the antitrust laws where none
was intended by Congress.
Other erroneous exemptions from the federal antitrust laws occur
in the state action area. The elusive state action exemption arose with
Parker v. Brown, which spoke only in broad, general terms about the
legislative command of the state. The lack of a definitive test has cre-
ated inconsistent findings by the lower courts. This inconsistency ne-
cessitates that a standard be developed to assure consistency. Consis-
tency can be achieved by the application of the Hecht test to cases in-
volving state action. Thus, this test should be used in determining
both state and federal action exemptions. When Hecht is applied in
this fashion, the national antitrust policy will be protected from further
encroachment by inconsistent, and often erroneous, decisions.
Anne Stone Pettigrew*
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